Meno by Plato
This post is part of my journey through the classic texts of Western civilization.
You have probably heard it before, that all philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato. This was the first time I have read Plato, though I have been introduced to his ideas and the broader Platonic tradition before. It is interesting to note that some of the church fathers were so impressed by Plato's insights that they thought he must have read Moses. But it is not as if they read Plato uncritically, and in that same spirit, I aim to acknowledge and glean insights from Plato while ultimately bringing them into a fuller Christian vision. I will first give an overview of the dialogue, touching on major points, and then I will end with a brief analysis.
Overview
What Is Virtue?
"Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?"
- Meno
This is the opening line of Plato's Meno, asked by the eponymous character in the dialogue, and it is a good summary of what this dialogue concerns along with the question of what virtue actually is. And the question of "what is virtue?" is where the dialogue between Meno and Socrates begins.
Take a moment to ask yourself how you would answer that question. I myself could not help but stop and think about how I would answer it, for it is admittedly not an easy question to answer. Perhaps you, like me, would attempt to answer that question by simply listing out a few examples of virtues, which happens to be exactly how Meno attempts to answer this question. It is in Socrates' response to this that we come across the Platonic theory of Forms/Ideas.
Theory of Forms/Idea
You undoubtedly recognized that the thing in the photo above is a bee. But how did you know it was a bee? Seriously consider that question. You have (probably) never seen this photo before, and yet you instantly recognized the subject in it as a bee. And if you were to see other bees, you could recognize those as bees as well, though no two bees are exactly alike. So what makes a bee a bee? To put it differently, what is "bee-ness"? This is what Socrates is getting at when he asks this same question to Meno.
SOCRATES: What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me?
MENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.
SOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike;—would you be able to answer?
For Plato, the ultimate and eternal realities are in the unseen realm of Forms/Ideas. Things in the seen/physical realm are temporary reflections/shadows of these Forms. The physical bees in this realm are reflections of "bee-ness" (the Form), and it is this "bee-ness" that Socrates is asking about. And so the question of "what is virtue?" is really getting to what the Form "virtue" is, which is where Socrates takes the dialogue to next.
SOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?
Meno stumbles around trying to come up with an answer to the question, until finally (perhaps out of annoyance) Socrates decides to join the inquiry. This inquiry into what virtue is soon turns to Meno's original question regarding how virtue is taught, and this is where we are introduced to Plato's epistemology.
Theory of Recollection
For Plato, there is no such thing as "learning" as we would typically understand it (receiving new knowledge we did not know prior). Instead, what we call learning/teaching is simply the drawing out of pre-existing knowledge from the soul, for the soul is immortal and at one point knew all the Forms. This is referred to as "recollection" (though the language of "learning" is still used for the sake of the vernacular, and I will do the same), for everything we "learn" is really just being recalled. This section from Socrates' explanation to Meno describes this:
"The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection..."
This is relevant to the discussion at hand, for Socrates and Meno agree that knowledge can be learned/taught ("recalled"), so if they can figure out whether or not virtue is knowledge, they can figure out whether or not virtue can be taught. The syllogism would go something like this:
- Knowledge can be taught.
- Virtue is knowledge.
- Therefore, virtue can be taught.
Socrates eventually remarks that he doubts virtue can be taught, for anything that can be taught has teachers and disciples, and Socrates has never seen any teachers of virtue. He lists various examples of virtuous men who had their sons taught many skills and trades but who never gained the virtue that characterized their fathers. All this to Socrates is evidence that virtue cannot be taught, for what virtuous man would not have his own son taught virtue if it were possible? Meno then asks how good and virtuous men came into being if they were not taught virtue, and this launches Socrates into the difference between knowledge and right opinion.
Knowledge vs. Right Opinion
SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion.
Right/true opinion is essentially a belief one holds that happens to be true, but the person has no justification for believing it. When one has justification for believing that true thing, though, one now has knowledge. Right opinion is true belief. Knowledge is justified true belief.
In terms of practical action, we see above that Socrates says "true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge," and he says elsewhere that "right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action." However, he does affirm that "knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion," for knowledge is right opinion that is fastened and bound by reason.
What are great and virtuous statesmen guided by then? Seeing that virtue cannot be taught (for there are no teachers of it), this means virtue is not knowledge, and so "[knowledge] cannot be supposed to be our guide to political life." Socrates states that knowledge and right opinion are the only right guides for man. Therefore, "the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion."
And at last, we arrive at the grand finale. The answer to Meno's original question:
"... virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous... the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God."
Analysis
The first thought I had when the dialogue finished was, "they never actually settled on what virtue is." Other than that, Meno was an enjoyable read and much easier than expected—I had expected Plato to be difficult (perhaps I will end up taking these words back when I get to the Republic). Plato gets a lot of things half-correct which is quite fascinating, but the Scriptures make clear what he did not understand.
The Platonic theory of Forms/Ideas is true enough. The physical things we see are temporary, and the ultimate and eternal realities are the unseen things—and what do you know, I'm quoting the Apostle Paul now:
"While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal."
- 2 Corinthians 4:18 (KJV)
While Plato places the Forms/Ideas in the "unseen realm," we can more specifically say that it is in the mind of God that these Forms/Ideas are.
With regards to the theory of recollection, there is certainly a half-truth in that there are indeed things that man has knowledge of without another man teaching him. The Apostle Paul teaches us in his epistle to the Romans that the natural law is written on the hearts of all men by God, the lawgiver:
"For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another;) In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel."
- Romans 2:14-16 (KJV)
One could note that the Romans 2 text above does not actually explicitly state that the Gentiles "know" the law, but rather that they act according to it for it is "written in their hearts." And so one could say that all men have right opinion of the natural law, but they do not necessary have knowledge if they cannot give a justification for the things in the law. However, the text also clearly states that God will judge men on account of this law, which would seem to imply that God will hold men accountable because they actually do KNOW it, even if they could not necessarily spell out a justification of the things in the law.
The question raised in Meno regarding the difference between knowledge and right opinion is one that is admittedly a tricky one for me. Does one need to have an explicitly stated reason for a belief to truly qualify as knowing it? Must a man state a reason to know when two colors go well together (or clash), or to know when a piece of music or art is beautiful? Is there any other justification for how one knows that the rising of the sun is a beautiful and glorious sight to behold other than "it is"?
These are questions I will continue to explore.